IN Brief:
- Leuze is bringing threat modelling, software bills of materials, code reviews and security testing into its sensor development process.
- Newly developed sensors are intended to support signed secure boot, restricted access, encrypted updates and recovery after failed installations.
- The EU Cyber Resilience Act introduced vulnerability reporting obligations in September 2026, with broader requirements applying in December 2027.
Leuze is integrating cybersecurity into the development and production of connected industrial sensors, with secure boot, restricted access and authenticated updates planned for newly developed devices. The German manufacturer is assessing the security requirements of its sensor families and incorporating protective measures at the design stage. The approach links firmware architecture, factory controls and vulnerability response so that protections can be maintained throughout a sensor’s service life.
The programme is aligned with the EU Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, which covers products with digital elements that fall within its scope. Obligations to report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe security incidents began on 11 September 2026. The broader product requirements apply from 11 December 2027, giving manufacturers a defined timetable for demonstrating security by design and documenting conformity for affected new products.
Early assessment allows Leuze to identify how a sensor communicates, which software components it contains and where unauthorised access could affect its operation. The company describes threat analysis, risk assessment, software bills of materials, code reviews, automated checks and penetration testing as part of the development process. These activities establish both the anticipated attack paths and the software dependencies that may need investigation when a vulnerability emerges.
A software bill of materials records the software packages used in a particular build, helping engineering teams connect vulnerability reports to affected firmware versions. Static code analysis and other automated checks examine the implementation during development, while penetration testing probes the behaviour of a device or system under attempted misuse. Applying the checks before production leaves scope to change software architecture, limit interfaces or strengthen access controls without relying solely on later patches.
New Leuze sensors are intended to verify the manufacturer’s digital signature before loading executable software. This secure boot mechanism establishes a controlled starting point for the firmware, while authenticated access and restricted permissions limit changes that can be made through available interfaces. Leuze is also adopting secure default settings, under which devices expose only the capabilities and access needed for their intended use. Those controls reduce unnecessary routes into the sensor’s configuration and operating functions.
Firmware updates extend the same trust checks into maintenance. Leuze describes encrypted delivery and verification of update packages, with a rollback mechanism designed to restore a secure operational state if an installation fails. Update and recovery behaviour have practical consequences for sensors used on production machinery, because equipment may need to retain its configuration and resume its specified sensing function after a disrupted installation. The exact implementation will depend on the individual product design.
During manufacturing, software artefacts are to be stored with digital signatures, access to relevant systems controlled and verification steps documented. Leuze also plans to check for updates, configure network security and archive device settings during commissioning. These steps connect the software approved for release with the version installed on equipment, making it easier to identify whether a deployed sensor is running the intended firmware and configuration.
A future digital product passport will provide documentation such as product manuals and certificates. Product records also support subsequent maintenance when an operator needs to identify the device variant, obtain relevant instructions or confirm its supported software. Leuze has described the passport as a planned measure; its existing sensor catalogue is not being presented as already equipped with one uniform security documentation package.
Once sensors are operating in the field, Leuze plans continued monitoring of public vulnerability databases and a defined process for assessing reported weaknesses, recording corrective action and informing affected customers. Mitigations may include firmware updates, depending on the affected product. In industrial installations, applying those changes also involves the equipment owner’s configuration control and maintenance procedures so that firmware revisions can be introduced alongside existing automation systems.
Functional safety and cybersecurity intersect where a compromised device could affect machine operation, but they are assessed through different technical requirements. A sensor’s safety-related function still needs the applicable safety engineering and validation, while protection against software manipulation requires security controls and supporting evidence. Leuze’s staged implementation therefore centres on model-specific technical measures, documented assessments and support arrangements as the Act’s wider requirements approach in December 2027.
